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Evidence and Analysis: The Iran-Contra Affair
As seen through American, Middle Eastern, and Soviet news sources

In early November 1986 a small local newspaper in Lebanon broke a scandal that would
cast dark shadows of suspicion on the Reagan Administration, call into question American global
leadership, and further complicate power dynamics and loyalties in the Middle East. The
international press quickly picked up the story of how the United States government had secretly
arranged arms sales to Iran through Israel and used the profits to fund Nicaraguan contra rebels.
In this arrangement, two separate American foreign policy schemes were joined in the
expectation of mutual benefit. The United States backed the contra rebels who were fighting
against the left-wing Sandinista government as part of its policy of preventing the spread of
leftist movements around the globe. In Iran, the American government hoped to appease
purported “moderates” in the Iranian government with arms sales in order to secure their help in
effecting the release of American hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. This move
was problematic in that the United States had, throughout the Iran-Iraq War, consistently urged
its allies not to fuel the conflict by providing arms to either party. Additionally, by funding the
contras, the Reagan Administration was circumventing the Boland amendments passed by the
Democrat-controlled Congress, which prohibited several government agencies from providing
military aid to the contras between December 1983 and September 1985. The Administration
exploited a loophole in this legislation by using the National Security Council (NSC), which was
not explicitly covered in the amendments, as the supervising body directing aid to the contras.1

1

Public Broadcasting Service. "The Iran-Contra Affair." PBS.org, accessed April 21, 2014,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/reagan-iran/

Shortly after the scandal broke, NSC officials Robert Poindexter and Oliver North
resigned and were fired, respectively. Higher officials in the government, including President
Reagan himself, were also implicated, although it was unclear to what extent these officials were
aware of or involved in the dealings. Reagan initially denied the operation had taken place at all;
although a week later, he retracted the denial, acknowledging the operation but maintaining that
the arms sales were not an arms-for-hostages deal. A presidential commission was soon
convened to investigate, resulting in a number of convictions and serious discussions about the
limits of the executive and the scope of congressional oversight in foreign affairs.2
Both the American public and the international community were shocked by the
revelation of the American scheme, which came to be popularly known as the Iran-Contra Affair.
The full implications of any international event occurring in the rapidly globalizing world of the
late 20th century cannot be understood without studying the event from multiple national
perspectives. By examining news coverage of the scandal in the United States in comparison
with the media of the Middle East—the region most directly affected by the deal; and the Soviet
Union, the United States’ Cold War rival—we get a valuable cross-section of the meanings and
implications of the event on the international stage.

American Media Coverage
Coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair in American newspapers presented the scheme in a
highly national-centric light. The scandal was acknowledged as a major discredit to the
American government, exposing significant internal issues. American reporting was largely
centered on the local effects of the Affair’s revelation on the American people.
2
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If the evolving press coverage of the incident was any indication, the scandal was a hard
pill for the American public to swallow. Americans were unsure whom in their government they
could trust. The Washington Post questioned whether or not President Reagan even knew of the
deal, explaining that the American President is “constitutionally indispensable…So he must be
protected, and at times that can mean protection even from significant knowledge.”3 Still, the
article went on, “If the Iran/contra connection was just the result of a twisted application of the
principle of deniability, it was atrocious enough.”4 Could it not be the President, someone within
the government should have stood up and spoken out against this warping of policy. The Post
called upon the President to accept or assign accountability, stating, “[Reagan] has a few weeks
to act on Henry Kissinger’s principle: whatever must be revealed eventually should be revealed
immediately.”5 As no one in the Administration seemed willing to offer the information the
American public so desired and deserved, the American press took it upon itself to hold the
government accountable.
Writers for The New York Times and the Washington Post repeatedly leveled the charge
that the American government was not serving its citizens properly. In an article dated
November 30th, 1986, the Post laments, “There’s little sign of recognition that the most fragile
and most precious political commodity is at risk: the public’s trust in its Government.”6 This
sentiment is echoed in another Washington Post piece profiling the first American hostage
released from Lebanon after the arms-for-hostages deal was initiated. The former captive,
Reverend Benjamin Weir is quoted as saying he “regretted the ‘trading of arms for hostages,’
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calling it a ‘questionable tactic,’” and stating that he would not want an escalation of the IranIraq War as a result of hostages being released.7
By presenting the viewpoint of one of the hostages himself, the newspaper used Reverend
Weir as a mouthpiece for the American people. Weir, described only by his rather ordinary
profession, represents the average American; thus, the reader takes his view as representative of
that of the public as a whole. Yet Weir is also extraordinary in that he found himself caught up in
the middle of an international conflict and scandal—an experience that would likely radicalize
even the most rational among us. It is perhaps expected that he would support nearly any means
necessary to secure the release of hostages, yet he stands with the rest of the American people in
denouncing the arms-for-hostages deal. In offering the Reverend and former hostage’s take on
the situation, the Washington Post emphasizes how deeply misaligned the United States
government’s covert deal with Iran was with the preferences of its citizens.
The American media also presented the Iran-Contra Affair as a symptom of a
government that was not functioning the way it should. As a nation that sees itself as a “city on a
hill” and prides itself on its unique brand of democracy—which it has, historically, even felt the
moral obligation to export to other nations, such a scandal was unacceptable to the United States.
The press searched for an explanation within the American democratic framework. A November
11th, 1986 article in The New York Times reported that the official Iran strategy approved by the
United States government involved securing Iran’s agreement to stop exporting terrorism and
revolution and begin negotiations to end the Iran-Iraq War, however “the checks and balances
broke down”8 and this strategy was neglected. One government official interviewed for the story
blamed the departure from policy on the National Security Council, which had circumvented
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other major governmental departments that should have been involved and would have better
understood and prevented the consequences of negotiating with terrorists.9 Not only had the
scandal shocked and outraged the public, but it had also divided the government. As the
mouthpiece of a nation committed to democratic ideals, American journalists exposed and
denounced the evils of corruption it had found in the government that was meant to inspire both
its own citizens and others throughout the world. It is interesting to note that two reputable
American newspapers, The New York Times and the Washington Post made the effort to
highlight the voices of outrage that came from within the government itself. This was likely done
in an attempt to preserve the faith of the American people and of the international community in
the existence of American politicians committed to justice, honesty, and the policies that the
nation had so vehemently espoused.
Secondarily, the American media zeroed in on what the Iran-Contra Affair would mean
for America’s reputation on the international stage. In a November 11th, 1986 article, The New
York Times questioned what the revelation of the arms-for-hostages deal would mean for
“America’s credibility abroad [and] the coherence of its foreign policy.”10 By undermining some
of its own key policy objectives, the Times acknowledged that the American government had
upset and confused its allies—especially friendly Arab nations, about the nature of its true
intentions. “American credibility was damaged among moderate Arab nations, which the
Administration needs as a buffer in its efforts to curb terrorism,”11 the same article laments. It is
interesting to note that this effect of the fallout was discussed significantly less frequently and
less thoroughly in American press than the internal consequences. This coverage also focused
mostly on how international connections and perceptions of the United States would suffer,
9
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rather than how other nations would be affected by the knowledge of the deal or by the IranianAmerican relationship itself.

Middle Eastern Media Coverage
Unlike the American press, media sources in the Middle East reacted to the breaking of
the Iran-Contra Affair with an attitude of smug acceptance, as if they had expected something
like this to come out for some time. Such a scandal aligned with and vindicated the pervasive
distrust of American credibility that prevailed throughout many Middle Eastern states. Quoted in
the Damascus Domestic Service, Syrian Foreign Minister responded to the news by stating “We
in Syria never believed that the United States has credibility with the Arabs…we hope that the
Arab states that have now discovered the United States’ lack of credibility will pursue their
policies in the future on the basis of that belief.”12 The Iraqi media also reported that Iraqis
remained unshaken by the news, acknowledging that the admission by the United States “proves
Iraq’s announcements about the suspicious and aggressive ties between the charlatan group in
Iran and Zionism.” Iraqi reporters went on to assure their audience that Iraq was not intimidated
by the trifecta, and would “continue to insist on defending the homeland and its sacred soil
against the aggression of the unjust group in Iran” as it had been doing.13
Newspapers throughout the Middle East tied the United States’ deal with Iran to
American imperialist tendencies in the Middle East. A Turkish report asserted, “all [Reagan’s]
realities are based on the globalist doctrines of the greatest imperialist state’s ruling circles who
consider all other countries and peoples pawns in their hegemonistic policies.”14 In early
December 1986, Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar al-’Arabi Al-Duwali backed this idea by running
12
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an interview with the former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, in which Bani-Sadr
dismissed the ideas that the Iran-Contra scandal was especially newsworthy and that the safe
return of hostages in Lebanon was even among the primary goals of the United States in the
region. Rather, according to Bani-Sadr, America had greater ambitions, including: gaining
control of OPEC, “replacing Saddam Husayn, establishing an Iranian regime close to the United
States, and controlling the terrorist groups.”15 The hostages-for-arms deal, which was viewed as
a major news event in the United States, was seen by Middle Easterners as just another step in a
series of American actions towards establishing an imperial relationship with Iran and expanding
its sphere of influence and control across the entire Middle Eastern region.
Along with these outdated imperialist tendencies, Middle Eastern media also discussed
the United States’ interactions with Iran in terms of a Cold War framework. As a major global
center of oil, the Middle East was considered an extremely important sphere of influence and had
been the theater for a number of Cold War power plays. As such, Middle Eastern states were
understandably suspicious of any Soviet or American actions in the region, and the revelation of
the American-led Iran-Contra scheme was no different. While expressing some bemusement at
the shock that accompanied the exposure of American-Iranian contacts, one Turkish news source
expressed the idea that the United States government was in fact turning the news to its
advantage, further advancing its Cold War, neo-imperialist agenda. The article argued that the
American government “want[ed] to prove now that nothing has changed…and that when the
need arises even Khomeyni goes to them asking for assistance. Thus, the Americans want to
convince the Third World, especially Islamic countries, that there is no alternative to alignment
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with the United States or the Soviet Union.”16 Albeit somewhat paranoid, this concern was not
without validity. Although the revelation of the arms-for-hostages deal hurt the United States’
credibility both at home and abroad, it did little to diminish perceptions of American power.
Despite some susceptibility to smaller-scale terrorist operations, the admission of US-Iranian
contacts reminded the world, and especially the Middle East that the United States still had a
monopoly on traditional hard power and the ability to affect the perpetuation and likely outcome
of conflicts even far from home.
Suspicions such as these were not inconsistent with widespread Middle Eastern
impressions of the United States, as reinforced by the arms-for-hostages scandal and colorfully
depicted in the press. The secret dealings of the American government and its duplicity towards
its own citizens meant that the United States was branded by the Middle Eastern media as
immoral and deceptive. In a November 25th, 1986 commentary, Our Radio in Turkey announced
that “Reagan’s national security adviser, Poindexter, said with no shame: Lying is a legitimate
tool in foreign policy.”17 The Damascus Domestic Service agreed with this depiction, reporting,
“The attainment of U.S. interests was not always sought through moral and principled means.”18
The United States was also characterized as inconsistent and hypocritical. The nation that
was perhaps the most outspoken champion of anti-terrorism had “turned state terrorism into a
principle of its foreign policy” 19 by militarily supporting Iran—a country frequently identified as
exporting terrorism. After seeing how the American government had abandoned its policy
against negotiating for hostages, former Iranian President Bani-Sadr told a Lebanese newspaper,
“[Americans] are capable of making a 180-degree turn in their policy.” The American
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government’s use of the revenues from its controversial arms sales to support the Contra war
against the government of Nicaragua and similar insurgencies in “several other freedom loving
countries” with Leftist leanings were also emphasized as contradictions of the nation that
professes itself a promoter of freedom around the globe. 20
To make matters worse, not only had the United States abandoned its policies, but it had
done so while continuing to compel its friends to hold to these policies. While the United States
was clandestinely arranging for Iran to receive renewed military supplies, it was simultaneously
“[forcing] its allies not to have anything to do with Iran.”21 The Middle Eastern media seized
onto this instance of American flip-flopping and used it to characterize the United States as an
international bully, using its power to coerce others into adhering to certain norms or policies,
while neglecting to do so itself.
Taking it a step further, Middle Eastern presses attacked the American democratic system
as well. Turkish media dismissed the claims of “bourgeois politicians” that “the principle of
democracy is carefully protected and everything is done out in the open.” Rather, the report
claims, “the bourgeois democracy is nothing but a cover behind which the imperialist class hides
to carry out arbitrary operations and brutality both in domestic and in foreign policy.”22 Middle
Eastern coverage of the Iran-Contra scandal discussed the event in terms that demonized the
political system that had fostered such moral decay and corruption. Turning the tables on the
country that has long purported to be a model of moral and political ideology—ideologies it
continues to try to export to regions like the Middle East—the Middle Eastern media raised
questions about the perceived superiority of American systems.
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Yet it was certainly not only the United States that received backlash in Middle Eastern
press coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair; Iran was also harshly attacked for its relations with the
“arch Satan.”23 Middle Eastern nations criticized Iran’s participation with Israel in the scheme,
accusing the Islamic nation of being a supporter of Zionism, and thus a traitor, to Islamic nations
and true Muslims everywhere. In a speech by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn transcribed in the
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, Husayn called the “cooperation with those claiming to be patriotic
Muslims and those claiming to seek the Liberation of Jerusalem” “shameful” and “dirty.”24 A
second Iraqi article, in the Baghdad Domestic Service labeled the tripartite Iran-Contra Affair an
act of “Zionist-imperialist-Khomeyniite” hostility to our struggler Arab nation.”25 Husyan used
this now-confirmed relationship between Iran and Israel as further proof of the justification for
the Iran-Iraq War, even claiming that Iran had been “brainwashing” the soldiers they sent to
battle and “try[ing] to create a certain romanticism about holy Jerusalem and its special status in
the hearts of some Iranians.”26 In this way, Husayn hoped to vilify and delegitimize the Islamic
revolutionary regime in Iran and increase support for the Iraqi war effort.

Soviet Media Coverage
Soviet coverage of the Iran-Contra Affair framed United States actions largely within a
Cold War context. Necessarily, much of the reporting is heavily critical of the United States and
the Soviet media capitalized on the opportunity to present its own nation as the alternative moral
superpower. Soviet coverage of the unfolding scandal betrayed a tinge of Cold War paranoia
towards the state’s competitor for global and ideological hegemony. A November 30th, 1986
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article speculated, “what has been revealed so far is just the tip of the iceberg.”27 The article
warned that the details coming out suggested that the United States and Israel did not act alone;
rather, NATO allies and American-friendly European nations also participated in supplying arms
to Iran as well. The Moscow Izvestiya deduced that the issue of the hostages was only a small
part of the reason the United States was supplying military aid to Iran. This article argued that
the primary purpose behind the United States support of the Iranian military effort was
“returning to the country which shares a border with the Soviet Union and which was at one time
considered by the United States to be its own domain.”28
In response, Soviet press heavily emphasized the hypocrisy in the United States’ deal
with the Iranians. Beyond the glaring contradiction between the United States’ professed policy
against negotiating with terrorists and the trading of arms for hostages, the Soviets attacked the
contradictions in the United States’ presentation of itself as a moral authority and leader of a
new, post-war world order. The Moscow TASS International Service chided the United States as
“active participants in supplying death arms to the conflict region between Iran and Iraq, which
[could] lead to further destabilization of the situation in this region in the world, which is
explosive even without this.” The article went on to criticize the United States’ support for the
Nicaraguan contras, pointing out that the action constituted infringement on Nicaraguan national
sovereignty and on the security of other peoples and states of the region as well.29 The Moscow
Izvestiya calls attention to another example of the American government violating another global
norm advocated widely by the United Nations and the United States; the right of self-
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determination. The newspaper points out that the United States-Israel partnership has been trying
to deny this right to Arab Palestinians and prevent them from forming their own state.30
Soviet media condemned these actions of the United States as part of a larger pattern of
“neogobalism”31 and imperialist tendencies. The Soviet press explained that renewing the
Iranian’s stock of arms perpetuated the Iran-Iraq War, which fit in “perfectly with the militarypolitical and strategic designs of the United States and Israel in the region.”32 Emphasizing the
United States’ role in perpetuating conflict in the already unstable Middle East and supporting
rebels working to destabilize a legitimate regime in Latin America, the Soviet presses worked to
portray the United States as an arrogant, manipulative meddler, which put its own international
interests above the national interests of other nations.
Setting up the United States as the international bad guy, the Soviet media offered its own
government as the alternative good guy in international affairs. In an article discussing the role of
entanglements of the United States with Iran, the Soviet press asserts “it is possible to state that
the policy of diversionary maneuvers and separate deals merely leads to the endless
postponement of a Near East settlement.” It is clear what “separate deals” the article is referring
to, published just weeks after the Iran-Contra scandal first broke. In the same piece denouncing
the American-led “dirty business” of supplying arms to fuel conflict in the Middle East, the
Izvestiya slipped in a reference to the Soviet Union’s “constructive proposal” made at the 41st
session of the UN General Assembly to begin work to set up a conference on the Near East to
figure out a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian problem.33 In this piece, the Izvestiya effectively
contrasted its portrayal of the the United States as a powerful, but dangerously self-interested
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international actor, with its depiction of the Soviet Union as a global superpower genuinely
acting in the best interests of the international community.
Beyond the United States’ international missteps, Soviet newspapers condemned
American internal handling of the affair as well. Likening the scandal to Watergate, the Moscow
TASS called the establishment of an committee to investigate “Irangate” “clearly…an attempt to
bring down the storm of criticism against the administration.”34 In Soviet eyes, the American
administration was more concerned with saving face than with honesty and good governance.
President Ronald Reagan suffered particularly harsh treatment in the Soviet press. He
was attacked as an unreliable and selfish leader, who, according to reports “actually tried to
disassociate himself further from any complicity in the scandal. He said that he would like the
commission to concentrate on the NSC staffers.”35 The President was seen by the Soviets as a
coward, forcing lower-ranking officials to take the fall for a scheme in which he was likely
involved, and manipulating evidence to save his own reputation. The Moscow Domestic Service
reported that “Poindexter and North were the tools of [a hypocritical] policy and they were
removed certainly not because Washington is abandoning this policy, but only because it took an
especially scandalous turn and it was necessary to divert the blame onto scapegoats.”36 The
Moscow TASS took the accusations even further, reporting that “the U.S. President frankly
intimated what conclusion he was awaiting from commission members: to whitewash the
administration and to pass off ‘Irangate’ as an affair of ‘individual’ staff members of the
National Security Council who got out of control of the leaders.”37
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In these portrayals, Soviet news sources attacked the ethics of the American leader,
damaging the moral authority of the nation as a whole. It is also interesting to note how the
Soviet coverage emphasizes the individual—primarily, the character of Reagan, but also the
importance of his scapegoats as being “individual” staff members. This reflects the emphasis on
individuality and the power of one in American culture, which proves in this instance to be a
double-edged sword that Reagan tries and fails to escape—at least according to the Soviet
interpretation.

Coverage Comparison
As details of the Iran-Contra Affair emerged, international media sources provided telling
glimpses of how their audiences perceived the event and what it meant to both their national
interests and global dynamics. Examining how the press in the United States, the Middle East,
and the Soviet Union represented the situation, certain trends emerge. While the United States
media expressed shock and outrage at the discovery that its government was negotiating with
terrorists and aiding the Iranian war effort, most Middle Eastern newspapers were already aware
of some level of collusion—or simply considered this departure from professed policy and
betrayal of trust quite in character for the amoral United States. Newspapers based in both the
Soviet Union and the Middle East also centered their coverage on the larger context of the
scandal, namely the cooperation between the United States and Iran; American media, on the
other hand, seemed obsessed with the specific discovery of the scandal itself. Additionally,
American coverage of the event was also extremely internally focused, with barely any column
space given to the international repercussions of the arrangement. Soviet newspapers, on the
other hand, placed a heavy emphasis on how the United States was perpetuating conflict and

instability in the Middle East, and threatening the universal right of self-determination in Latin
America. Both Middle Eastern and Soviet news sources placed the Iran-Contra Affair in the
context of the Cold War and America’s “neo-imperialist” aspirations for influence and control
throughout the world.
While the United States media made efforts to hold the American government
accountable for abandoning its professed policy and deceiving its citizenry, it also worked to
assure its audience of the presence of moral and honest politicians in the government. Both
Middle Eastern and Soviet newspapers, however, took the opportunity to emphasize the negative
aspects of the United States government and diplomacy, often comparing the American
government with their nations’ own to make their governments to look better by comparison.
American newspapers also framed the scandal as resulting from a failure to adhere to noble
democratic principles, while Middle Eastern sources used the outcry to discredit the democratic
system as a whole. It is also interesting to note that, while both American and Soviet newspapers
focused on reporting objective facts (which are naturally tinged by bias in style of reporting and
in what facts they choose to include), much of Middle Eastern reporting surrounding the IranContra Affair consisted of interviews, transcriptions, or commentaries of speeches by Middle
Eastern politicians or officials.
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